WWFC Asia's video: Syrian War Updates 21st June 2018

Dynamics in the southern front in Syria have reached a tipping point. Russian-Israeli coordination is taking precedence over the ceasefire agreement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached on the sidelines of the G20 summit last year. Iran and the United States are both facing increasing pressure in the area, while both the Syrian regime and the Syrian armed opposition are on alert over a potential clash to settle the question of who controls the southwest border areas. US' ambivalent role on the southern front The US used to play a significant role on the southern front. The Amman-based US-led Military Operations Center (MOC) was providing training and weaponry to a number of Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups operating in southwest Syria between 2014 and 2016. The US and the FSA groups did not see eye to eye on whether the priority was to fight the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) group or the Syrian regime. Ultimately, when Washington signed the ceasefire agreement with Moscow, it closed the supply lines to the southern front. Jordan sealed off its border with Syria after it was overwhelmed by the large number of refugees fleeing the Syrian war. Since then, the southern front became a low priority issue for the Trump administration compared with the high-level US diplomatic and military engagement on the northern front. But the Russian-Israeli coordination, which has increased to unprecedented levels in recent weeks at the expense of both the US and Iran, has compelled the Trump administration to come back on the scene. It is currently trying to pressure Russia to fulfil its commitments from the July 2017 ceasefire. The negotiated plan reportedly trades the US vacating al-Tanf base for withdrawing Iranian forces and their backed militias from southwest Syria. Al-Tanf is located in the southern part of Homs governorate, on the border with Iraq and was used by US forces to train Syrian rebels in the past. The Syrian regime and its Iranian allies have hoped to take control of the area and the al-Waleed border crossing for a while in order to open the Baghdad-Damascus highway. The US offer to Russia includes keeping all Syrian and foreign militias 20 to 25km away from the Jordanian border, transferring the opposition fighters and their families to Idlib, reopening the Nasib border crossing (near Deraa city) with Jordan, and forming a joint US-Russian mechanism to oversee the agreement. The key US interlocutor, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs David Satterfield, is on his way out and will soon be replaced by David Schenker whose views on Syria are more aligned with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and White House National Security Adviser John Bolton. It is not clear whether this reported US offer will stand. Moreover, if the US does not vacate al-Tanf, Iran and the Syrian regime will most likely attempt to block any deal on the southern front. Two scenarios for the US Washington has a rather limited set of options. The first scenario would see the US taking a backseat and giving up all influence in southwest Syria in return for keeping Iran away from the Jordanian and Israeli borders. Russia will then exclusively dominate the rules of engagement in this area. Hence Israel will be able to blame only Moscow in case of any agreement violation. Washington will also leave once again the impression of giving up on allies, the FSA in this case, but US forces can instead focus their resources on protecting their assets in the friendlier environment of northeast Syria. The second scenario would see the Trump administration opting to revive its role in the southern front. US fighter jets or drones could target Syrian regime attempts to expand territorial control in Deraa and Quneitra provinces. The US could also re-open the supply lines via Jordan to the FSA groups, which would technically mean re-escalation of the Syrian civil war. The Pentagon wants to avoid both scenarios.